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This article highlights a number of current hearsay is-
sues. It is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject but 
rather a catalog of issues that are important either because 
they are problematic or because they arise frequently in 
criminal litigation. 
RIGHTTO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
Ohio Rule 802 provides that hearsay may be admissible 
if it fits an exception recognized by the "Constitution of the 
United States" or by the "Constitution of the State of Ohio:· 
The leading case on this point is Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the United States Supreme 
Court held that state evidentiary rules that precluded the ad-
mission of critical and reliable evidence denied the defen-
dant due process. One of the rules in Chambers that made 
defense evidence inadmissible was the hearsay rule, i.e., 
' Mississippi's failure to admit declarations against penal in-
" terest. According to the Court, "[i]n these circumstances, 
where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertain-
ment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be ap-
plied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice:· ld. at 
302. 
In a later case, the Court again overturned a conviction 
because the application of the hearsay rule precluded the 
admission of defense evidence. The Court commented: 
Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes 
within Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this 
case its exclusion constituted a violation of the Due 
l; Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
( excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical 
' issue in the punishment phase of the trial ... and sub-R stantial reasons existed to assume its reliability. IJ Georgia v. Green, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979). 
t~ Thus, the admission of hearsay evidence offered by the de-
~· fendant in a criminal case may be constitutionally compelled 
tt-, - provided a showing of reliability is made. See generally 2 
W McCormick, Evidence § 252, at 129 (4th ed. 1992) ("[T]he 
Fl. due process clause may require the admission of hearsay, r though inadmissible under applicable hearsay rules, if of 
~'; sufficient reliability and importance:'); Clinton, The Right to 
, \ Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee 
kJ.' 
in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711 (1976). 
Several Ohio cases have discussed this issue. In State v. 
Sumlin, 69 Ohio St.3d 105, 107, 630 N.E.2d 681 (1994), the 
Ohio Supreme Court, citing Chambers, recognized that 
hearsay evidence that does not fall within one of the enu-
merated exceptions may nevertheless be admissible "pur-
suant to general principles of due process:' The Court went 
on, however, to rule that Sumlin was not such a case. 
Similarly, the court of appeals recently addressed the issue 
in State v. Patterson, i 10 Ohio App.3d 264, 673 N.E.2d 
1001 (1996). The court wrote: 
Chambers does not stand for the proposition that a de-
fendant is entitled to introduce a// exculpatory and in-
culpatory matter in out-of-court statements; rather, 
Chambers stands for the broad proposition that the 
hearsay rule "should not be applied mechanistically" to 
exclude hearsay testimony that is trustworthy in cases 
where an accused's constitutional rights are implicat-
ed. Here, in accordance with the Supreme Court's 
holding in Chambers, the trial court allowed the intro-
duction of Roberts's hearsay statements that were 
against his penal interest and thus were likely to be 
trustworthy. ld. at 274 (quoting Chambers). 
The due process principle recognized in Chambers is im-
portant in Ohio because Ohio has not adopted a residual 
hearsay exception, which is found in the Federal Rules and 
most other states. (As of December 1, 1997, the two resid-
ual exceptions found in Federal Rules 803(24) and 
804(b)(5) have been combined in a new Federal Rule 807). 
The Chambers principle arises in other contexts, such as 
the rape shield law and polygraph evidence. See 1 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence § 
404.8 (1996) (rape shield law: constitutionality); 1 Giannelli 
& lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 8.3(D) (2d ed. 1993) 
(polygraph: constitutional arguments). Indeed, one com-
mentator has observed: "Broadly construed, [Chambers} 
appears to recognize that the accused in a criminal pro-
ceeding has a constitutional right to introduce any exculpa-
tory evidence, unless the state can demonstrate that it is so 
inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no rational 
basis for evaluating its truth." Westen, The Compulsory 
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Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 151-52 (1974). 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
Objection to prosecution hearsay evidence based on 
confrontation grounds should specify the Ohio as well as 
the United States Constitution. In State v. Storch, 66 Ohio 
St.3d 280,291,612 N.E.2d 305 (1993), the Ohio Supreme 
Court stated that the admission of a statement pursuant to a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception "may violate our state con-
stitutional right of confrontation:' Significantly, the Court in-
dicated that the Ohio Constitution provides greater con-
frontation protection than that provided by the federal consti-
tution. The Court commented that the current interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment by the United States Supreme 
Court "provides less protection for the accused than the pro-
tection provided by the Sixth Amendment as traditionally 
construed and by the express words of Section 1 0, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution." ld. at 291. The Ohio Constitution, 
in the Court's view, generally requires a demonstration of 
the declarant's unavailability before hearsay statements are 
admissible: 
We construe the right to confrontation contained in 
Section 1 0, Article I to require live testimony where 
reaso·nably possible. However, circumstances may 
exist where the evidence clearly indicates that a child 
may suffer significant emotional harm by being forced 
to testify in the actual presence of a person he or she 
is accusing of abuse. In such circumstances, the child 
may be considered unavailable for purposes of the 
Rules of Evidence and the out-of-court statements ad-
mitted without doing violence to Section 10, Article I, 
assuming Evid.R. 807 is otherwise satisfied. ld. at 293. 
See also State v. Ulis, 91 Ohio App.3d 656, 633 N.E.2d 562 
(1993) (following Storch); State v. McWhite, 91 Ohio App.3d 
508, 513, 632 N.E.2d 1320 (1993) ("While we strongly dis-
agree with the analysis and conclusion of the Ohio Supreme 
Court in [Storch], as to requirements it imposes on the im-
plementation of the Ohio Rules of Evidence through a man-
ufactured interpretation of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, that is inconsistent with what is stated in the 
rules themselves, contrary to its own prior decision, and 
above and beyond what is required by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
United States Supreme Court, we reluctantly agree Storch 
requires this court to reach this result:'). 
For a discussion of the right of confrontation, see 2 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Evidence §§ 
802.8 & 9 (1996). 
HEARSAY "STATEMENTS": DEFINED 
Ohio Rule 801 (A) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by him as an assertion." 
Tape Recordings 
Tape recordings, including the audio part of a videotape, 
often raise hearsay issues because the statements on the 
tape were made out of court. For example, in State v. 
Paxton, 110 Ohio App.3d 305, 318, 67 4 N.E.2d 379 (1995), 
the court of appeals wrote: "The inclusion of all of the audio 
portions of the videotapes constituted prejudicial error in 
this case, as several statements which were played for the 
jury were ... outside the scope of a present sense impres-
sion [exception] ... :· Of course, the tape recording is 
hearsay only if it is offered for the truth of the assertions 
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contained therein. See State v. Kinley, 72 Ohio St.3d 491, 
498, 651 N.E.2d 419 (1995) ("The tape was not offered to 
prove the truth of any statement or assertion contained in 
the recording."). 
Assertive Conduct 
Rule 801 also treats nonverbal conduct intended as an 
assertion (assertive conduct) as hearsay. McCormick ob-
served that "non-verbal conduct may unmistakably be just 
as assertive in nature as though expressed in words. No 
one would contend, if, in response to a question 'Who did 
it?', one of the auditors held up her hand, that this gesture 
could be treated as different from an oral or written state-
ment." 2 McCormick, Evidence § 250, at 1 07 (4th ed. 1992). 
Accord Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence Handbook § 
801 .2, at 711 (3d ed. 1991) ("Nonverbal conduct may on oc-
casion clearly be the equivalent of an assertive statement, 
that is, done for the purpose of deliberate communication, 
and thus classified as hearsay:'). 
The federal drafters provided another illustration: "Some 
nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a 
suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words, as-
sertive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement." 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 801. See also 
United States v. Caro, 569 F.2d 411, 416 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(in response to question where drugs came from, the per-
son pointed to particular vehicle); Stevenson v. 
Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 779 (Va. 1977) (Wife's handing 
to police of the clothes the defendant was wearing on day of 
the homicide pursuant to police request is hearsay.). 
Nonassertive Conduct: "Implied Assertions" 
Conduct that is not intended by the declarant to be an as-
sertion is not encompassed by the definition of "statement" 
in Rule 801 (A). Accordingly, the hearsay rule is not a bar to 
the admissibility of evidence of nonassertive conduct. For 
example, evidence of flight from the scene of a crime is not 
hearsay under Rule 801 because such conduct is not in-
tended to be an assertion. Similarly, in United States v. 
Zenni, 492 F.Supp. 464 (E.D. 1980), while searching the lo-
cation of an illegal bookmaking operation, the police re-
ceived telephone calls from persons attempting to place 
bets. The court ruled that the bettors did not intend to make 
an assertion and therefore their conduct was not hearsay. 
There are only a few Ohio cases on this issue. In State v. 
Kniep, 87 Ohio App.3d 681, 685, 622 N.E.2d 1138 (1993), 
the defendant was accused of physically abusing his infant 
daughter. At trial, the prosecution showed a videotape of 
the daughter crying while the defendant held her. The de-
fendant objected on the ground that the depiction of her re-
action to him was hearsay. The appellate court found that 
the daughter's conduct was nonassertive and thus not 
hearsay. As the court noted, the infant was six months old 
at the time of the videotaping; "[g]iven her age and concomi-
tant mental abilities, [her] crying cannot be considered con-
duct intended by her to be an assertion of her belief:' The 
court concluded: "Nonverbal conduct is hearsay only when 
it is intended by the actor to be an assertion of his belief." 
While this result correctly addresses the hearsay issue, it ig-
nores the relevance issue. The relevance of the evidence is 
dubious at best, and should have been inadmissible under 
Rule 403(A) as unfairly prejudicial. 
STATEMENTS NOT OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH 
Explaining Police Behavior 
It is axiomatic that out-of-court statements are hearsay 
only if offered to prove the truth of the assertion. This rule, 
~. _·"· however, is often abused. For example, the admissibility of 
\'t out-of-court statements explaining police behavior raises 
significant issues under Rule 403. In State v. Williams, 115 
Ohio App.3d 24, 684 N.E.2d 358 (1996), detectives testified 
to information provided by informants. The court of appeals 
upheld the admissibility of the informants' statements as 
non hearsay evidence: "[T]he purpose of this testimony was 
not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to 
explain what the mind-set of the officers had been when 
they executed the search warrant. The courts of this state 
have generally held that testimony concerning the basis or 
reason for an officer's actions during an investigation is not 
considered hearsay:' ld. at 44. See also State v. Thomas, 61 
Ohio St.2d 223, 232, 400 N.E.2d 401 (1980) ("The testimo-
ny at issue was offered to explain the subsequent investiga-
tive activities of the witnesses. It was not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted:'). 
There are several problems with such cases. First, un-
less the defense makes an issue of how the investigation 
was conducted, such background information is simply not 
relevant. See United States v. Lamberty, 778 F.2d 59, 61 
(1st Cir. 1985) ("We do not find that the evidence introduced 
to show the government's motive in setting the trap is in any 
way relevant to proving the elements of the counts charged. 
While the jurors may have been curious as to why the in-
spectors began their operation, enlightenment on this mat-
ter had no probative value."); United States v. Taylor, 900 
F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1990) (reason why suspect targeted not 
(' relevant to guilt). 
Second, despite a limiting instruction, the jury will often 
use the information substantively, thereby raising both 
hearsay and confrontation issues. McCormick wrote: 
[O]ne area of apparently widespread abuse should be 
noted. In criminal cases, an arresting or investigating 
officer should not be put in the false position of seem-
ing just to have happened upon the scene; he should 
be allowed some explanation of his presence and con-
duct. His testimony that he acted "upon information re-
ceived," or words to that effect, should be sufficient. 
Nevertheless, cases abound in which the officer is al-
lowed to relate historical aspects of the case, replete 
with hearsay statements in the form of complaints and 
reports, on the ground that he was entitled to give the 
information upon which he acted. The need for the ev-
idence is slight, the likelihood of misuse great. 2 
McCormick, Evidence § 249, at 104 (4th ed. 1992) (ci-
tations omitted). 
See also United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th 
Cir. 1997) ("Courts and commentators have recognized that 
out-of-court statements should not be admitted to explain 
why a law enforcement agency began an investigation if the 
statements present too great a danger of prejudice:'); 
Garrett v. United States, 78 F.3d 1296, ~ 302-03 (8th Cir.) 
("fairness demands that the government find a way to get 
. the background into evidence without the hearsay"), cert. 
,c '. denied, 117 S.Ct. 37 4 (1996); United States v. Hernandez, 
750 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1985) (referral by U.S. Customs of 
defendant as a drug smuggler inadmissible to explain moti-
vation behind OEA investigation); United States v. Escobar, 
67 4 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982) (error to allow officer to testify 
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that he ran the defendant's name through a computer and 
the resulting printout read "suspected" narcotics smuggler). 
STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION 
Under Ohio Rule 801 (0)(1 )(c), a witness's prior state-
ment "of identification of a person soon after perceiving" that 
person is admissible as substantive evidence "if the circum-
stances demonstrate the reliability of the prior identification." 
For example, an identification made at a lineup, show-up, 
photographic display, or prior hearing falls within the rule. 
Several cases addressing this rule have caused confu-
sion. In State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 126, 545 
N.E.2d 1220 (1989), the Ohio Supreme Court indicated 
that, in child sexual abuse cases, "Evid.R. 801 (0)(1 )(c) may 
be used to admit the out-of-court statement of a child de-
clarant identifying, to a third person, the perpetrator of al-
leged child abuse." In State v. Storch, 66 Ohio St.3d 280, 
292, 612 N.E.2d 305 (1993), the Court commented that this 
rule would permit the admission of a videotape of a child 
abuse victim's statements: 
In many instances, Evid.R. 801 (0)(1) or other Rules of 
Evidence would allow for admission of the audio tapes 
or vide9tapes. If taping occurs and the tape is actually 
admitted into evidence, the trier of fact would have the 
benefit of the child's actual words and at least some in-
sight as to the child's demeanor. The trial court also 
would have the benefit of the actual questions or con-
versation which led up to the child's indication that an 
individual had abused the child. Certainly the ques-
tions asked can be a significant factor in determining 
the reliability of the response .... 
These cases raise serious problems. First, the rule ex-
plicitly requires cross-examination of the declarant "concern-
ing the statement." See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 
554 (1988). This means the child must testify at trial. 
Second, only an "identification" is admissible; a discourse 
about the crime is not admissible. Finally, the legislative his-
tory indicates that "stranger" identifications were the focus of 
the rule. In other words, identifications at lineups, showups, 
and photographic displays are admissible, because they are 
more reliable than an in-court identification of the accused. 
In State v. Turvey, 84 Ohio App.3d 724, 7 41, 618 N.E.2d 
214 (1992), the court of appeals correctly observed that the 
rule had been misused in the post-Boston cases. The court 
wrote: 
[A] difference exists between the thirteen pre-Boston 
and the ten post-Boston Ohio appellate court cases 
citing Evid.R. 801 (0)(1 )(c). The pre-Boston cases gen-
erally involved identifications made by strangers to law 
enforcement personnel during the course of investiga-
tions conducted shortly after the crime. The stranger 
often, but not always, identified the defendant among 
others in a line-up or photo array. In the pre-Boston 
cases, the identifications were necessary to prove no 
other person committed the crime. 
By contrast, the majority of the post-Boston cases 
citing [the rule] involved close relatives- two fathers, 
three stepfathers, and one uncle- of child victim-de-
clarants. The post-Boston identifications generally in-
volved identifications made by children to mothers or_ 
doctors weeks or months after the crime. The child ob-
served neither the defendant nor the defendant's pho-
tograph during the identification. In the post-Boston 
cases, the identifications addressed not the identitv of 
57 22~Lcu 2811 iiJ 
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the defendant, but rather addressed the fact a crime 
was committed. ld. at 739-40. 
The principal problem is Boston itself and not merely the 
post-Boston cases. 
ACCUSED'S ADMISSIONS 
Under Rule 801 (D)(2)(a), statements of a party are ad-
missible as substantive evidence if offered against that 
party. The confession of a criminal defendant is an admis-
sion of a party-opponent. 
A party cannot, however, introduce his own statements 
under this rule. In In re Coy, 67 Ohio St.3d 215, 218, 616 
N.E.2d 1105 (1993), the Ohio Supreme Court correctly 
noted that the party admission rule "applies to statements 
offered against a party where the statements are the party's 
own. Here the statements offered were [those of a child 
sexual abuse victim]. They were offered by [the victim] 
against her father. They were not her own statements being 
offered against her:' 
Corpus Delicti Rule 
Like many jurisdictions, Ohio imposes a corroboration re-
quirement on the admissibility of confessions. Under this 
rule, there must be some independent evidence of the cor-
pus delicti before a confession is admissible. See State v. 
Black, 54 Ohio St.2d 304, 376 N.E.2d 948 (1978); State v. 
Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), vacat-
ed on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978); State v. Maranda, 
94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916); State v. King, 10 
Ohio App.3d 161, 460 N.E.2d 1383 (1983); State v. Duerr, 8 
Ohio App.3d 396, 457 N.E.2d 834 {1982), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 816 {1983); State v. Ralston, 67 Ohio App.2d 81, 425 
N.E.2d 916 (1979). 
The corroboration requirement "has traditionally been 
based upon concern that convictions might result from false 
confessions:· 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 145, at 556 (4th ed. 
1992). See also 7 Wigmore, Evidence§§ 2070-75 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Several recent cases have addressed this issue. The 
court of appeals in State v. Nobles, 106 Ohio App.3d 246, 
665 N.E.2d 1137 (1995), explained the rule as follows: 
The corpus delicti r.ule, as employed in the context 
of extrajudicial confessions, is informed by a desire to 
protect unfortunate persons who confess to crimes 
that they not only did not commit themselves, but 
which were never committed by anyone. Before the 
rule was formed, it sometimes happened that a person 
'would confess to killing another, be convicted of that 
killing and put to death, only to have the supposed 
murder victim turn up later, alive and healthy .... 
The rule ... is applied to all crimes, not homicide 
alone. Before an extrajudicial confession of a crime is 
competent to be admitted at the confessor's trial, the 
state must first introduce evidence independent of the 
confession tending to establish "(1) the act, and (2) the 
criminal agency of that act:' ... The evidence adduced 
must meet some essential element of the crime 
charged, though it need not meet all of them .... The 
evidence need not be so strong that it is capable of 
persuading a factfinder on some element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but "there must be some 
proof, not necessarily direct and positive, usually but 
circumstantial, tending to prove the fact that a crime 
was committed." ld. at 261-62 (quoting State v. 
4 
Edwards 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976) 
(syllabus: para. 1 a) and State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 
364,371,114 N.E.1038 (1916)). 
see also State v. Clark, 1 06 Ohio App.3d 426, 431, 666 
N.E.2d 308 (1995) ("The corpus delicti rule requires that the 
state present 'some evidence outside of the confession that 
tends to prove some material element of the crime charged' 
in order to admit a confession:') (quoting State v. Maranda). 
ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS: BY SILENCE 
Under Ohio Rule 801 (D)(2)(b), a statement about which 
a party "has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth" is 
admissible as substantive evidence if offered against that 
party. A party may adopt the statement of a third person by 
failing to deny or correct under circumstances in which it 
would be natural to deny or correct the truth of the state-
ment- adoption by silence. See Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. Evid. R. 801 ("When silence is relied upon, the 
theory is that the person would, under the circumstances, 
protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue:'); 2 
McCormick, Evidence § 262, at 176 (4th ed. 1992). 
The silence of an accused after receiving Miranda warn-
ings raises co_nstitutional issues. See 1 Giannelli & Snyder, 
Baldwin's Ohio Practice § 613.10 (1996) (discussing Doyle 
v. Ohio). The adoption-by-silence issue, however, may also 
arise outside the confession context. See United States v. 
Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("When Monroe 
told Officer Dunston that he could get another rock of crack 
from 'my buddy,' Beckham immediately got up from his chair, 
walked over to a stash of crack that was packaged for distri-
bution, and began to open it. By that action, Beckham indi-
cated his endorsement of Monroe's statement:'). 
The Ohio cases have recognized the admission-by-si-
lence rule. See Hoover v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41, 47, 109 
N.E. 626 (1914); Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 (1881). In 
Zeller v. State, 123 Ohio St. 519, 523, 176 N.E. 81 (1931 ), 
the Ohio Supreme Court stated: "The only theory upon 
which any confession [admission] by silence is admissible is 
that the statement of the third person, in the presence of the 
accused, is made under such circumstances that the si-
lence of the accused gives rise to a natural and reasonable 
inference of assent thereto ... :· In Geiger v. State, 70 Ohio 
St. 400, 413, 71 N.E. 721 (1904), the Supreme Court com-
mented: "We cannot refrain from the observation, that be-
fore a court admits this class of confessions, great caution 
should be exercised .... it is not every instance of silence in 
the hearing of accusation that renders it admissible, as ad-
mitting guilt." In many cases the courts have found that the 
circumstances did not require a response. In other words, 
silence is not equivalent to assent. See also Griffith v. 
Zipperwick, 28 Ohio St. 388, 409 (1876); Walker v. State, 37 
Ohio App. 540, 175 N.E. 29 (1930). 
This is consistent with McCormick's position that "(t]he 
essential inquiry in each case is whether a reasonable per-
son under the circumstances would have denied the state-
ment:' 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 262, at 178 (4th ed. 1992). 
It is not sufficient that the statement was made in the pres-
ence of a party. McCormick fists several factors that should 
be considered in determining admissibility: 
(1) The statement must have been heard by the party 
claimed to have acquiesced. (2) It must have been un-
derstood by the party. (3) The subject matter must have 
been within the party's knowledge .... (4) Physical or 
emotional impediments to responding must not be 
present. (5) The personal makeup of the speaker, e.g., 
young child, or the person's relationship to the party or 
the event, e.g., bystander, may be such as to make it 
unreasonable to expect a denial. (6) Probably most im-
portant of all, the statement itself must be such as i' would, if untrue, call for a denial under the circum-
stances. 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 262, at 177-78 (4th 
ed 1992). 
See also 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1072 (Chadbourn rev 
1972); State v. White, 110 Ohio App.3d 347, 360, 674 
N.E.2d 405 (1996) ("A person admits the truth of a state-
ment by adoption when that person hears, understands, 
and acquiesces in another person's statement when a rea-
sonable person could and would have spoken out in de-
nial:'). 
AGENT ADMISSIONS: BY ATTORNEYS & POLICE 
Under Ohio Rule 801 (D)(2)(c), statements made by a 
person who was authorized by a party to make a statement 
are admissible as substantive evidence if offered against 
that party. Significantly, the statement of an attorney may 
be admissible against the client as either an authorized ad-
mission, because the attorney usually has "speaking author-
ity;' or as an agent a·dmission. See United States v. GAF 
Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1991 ). 
Defense Opening Statement. In United States v. 
McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984), a prosecution expert 
concluded that a xerox machine located at the place of em-
ployment of the accused's wife made photocopies associat-
ed with the crime. In his opening statement, the defense 
counsel stated that a defense expert would testify that this 
machine did not make these copies. The trial terminated in 
i' a mistrial during the prosecution case-in-chief, and the de-
. fense expert subsequently learned that his former teacher 
would be a substitute prosecution expert at the retrial. At 
the retrial, the defense position changed significantly. The 
defense opening statement in the earlier trial was intro-
duced by the prosecution in the later trial as an admission: 
"The expert testimony about the xerox machine promised by 
Kennedy [defense counsel] in the opening statement at the 
[earlier] trial was in support of a factual claim that Olive 
McKeon had not copied the documents. Kennedy's opening 
argument at the [later] trial, stating that Olive McKeon had 
indeed copied the documents at the request of her hus-
band, was facially and irreconcilably at odds with the earlier 
assertion." ld. at 33. 
Police Admissions. Generally, the agent-admission rule 
does not apply to law enforcement officers. Most federal 
cases have held that the statements of government agents 
are not admissible against the prosecution under Federal 
Rule 801 (d)(1 )(D). E.g., United States v. Prevatte, 16 F. 3d 
767,779 n. 9 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kampiles, 609 
F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 
(1980); United States v. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 
(D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, 835 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987). The 
leading case is United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d 
Cir. 1967). 
This position, however, has been challenged. See 
lmwinkelried, Of Evidence and Equal Protection: The 
.I ~Jnconstitutionality of Excluding Government Agents 
'Statements Offered as Vicarious Admissions Against the 
Prosecution, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 269 (1986). In addition to the 
equal protection argument, this rule should be attacked 
under the right-to-present-a-defense line of cases discussed 
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earlier. 
Prosecutor's Admissions. In contrast, the agent-ad-
mission rule applies to the prosecuting attorney. See United 
States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
("The Federal Rules clearly contemplate that the federal 
government is a party-opponent of the defendant in criminal 
cases ... :'). In addition to agent admissions, these state-
ments may also be adoptive admissions. In United States v. 
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988), the First Circuit ruled 
that a government brief in a civil case, which contradicted a 
prosecution witness, constituted an adoptive admission: 
The Justice Department here has, as clearly as possi-
ble, manifested its belief in the substance of the con-
tested documents; it has submitted them to other fed-
eral courts to show the truth of the matter contained 
therein. We agree with Justice (then Judge) Stevens 
that the assertions made by the government in a for-
mal prosecution (and, by analogy, a formal civil de-
fense) "establish the position of the United States and 
not merely the views of its agents who participate 
therein. ld. at 131 (citing United States v. Powers, 467 
F.2d 1089, 1097 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting)). 
See also United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218, 1221 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (statements by the prosecution during voir dire 
would be binding against the government if they had consti-
tuted a clear and unambiguous admission). Other exam-
ples include: 
(1) Affidavits, United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 
938 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[W]here ... the government 
has indicated in a sworn affidavit to a judicial offi-
cer that it believes particular statements are trust-
worthy, it may not sustain an objection to the sub-
sequent introduction of those statements on 
grounds that they are hearsay:'). 
(2) Search warrants, United States v. Ramirez, 894 
F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen the govern-
ment advances a statement of its agent in a judicial 
proceeding to obtain a search warrant, the govern-
ment has adopted the content of the statement, 
and a criminal defendant may introduce the state-
ment as a party admission under Fed. R. Evid. 
801 (d)(2)(B):'). 
(3) Bill of particulars, United States v. GAF Corp., 928 
F.2d 1253, 1260-61 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Confidence in 
the justice system cannot be affirmed if any party 
is free, wholly without explanation, to make a fun-
, damental change in its version of the facts between 
trials, and then conceal this change from the final 
trier of the facts .... A bill of particulars ... is pre-
pared, reviewed, and presented by an agent of the 
United States:'), and 
(4) Government manuals. United States v. Van Griffin, 
87 4 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1989) ("We do not say 
that every publication of every branch of govern-
ment ... can be treated as a party admission by the 
United States under Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(D). In 
this case the government department charged with 
the development of rules for highway safety was 
the relevant and competent section of the govern-
ment: its pamphlet on sobriety testing was an ad-
missible party admission."). 
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CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS 
Under Ohio Rule 801 (D){2)(e), a statement made by a 
coconspirator of a party during and i~ furth.erance_of the 
conspiracy is admissible as substant1ve ev1dence If offered 
against that pa~ty .. The crim~ of conspiracy need not be 
charged in the md1ctment or mformat1on. Indeed, the rule 
also applies in civil cases. 
Independent Proof Requirement 
In contrast to the federal rule, the Ohio rule expressly re-
quires that the conspiracy, as well as the declarant's and de-
fendant's participation, be established "upon independent 
proof of the conspiracy." In other words, the statement itself 
cannot be used to establish the existence of the conspiracy. 
The independent proof requirement is based on Michigan 
Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) and pre-Rules Ohio law. See State v. 
Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 240, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1 977) 
(conspiracy established by "other evidence"), vacated on 
other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1 978); State v. Osborne, 49 
Ohio St.2d 135, 143, 359 N.E.2d 78 (1976), vacated on 
other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1 978); State v. Carver, 30 
Ohio St.2d 280,287,285 N.E.2d 26 (1972), cert. denied, 
409 u.s. 1044 (1972). 
Federal practice is different. In Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the Federal Rules abolished the independent 
proof requirement. In contrast to the Ohio rule, the federal 
rule does not include the "upon independent proof" lan-
guage. In 1997, the federal rule was amended to codify the 
Bourjaily holding. The following sentence was added to 
Rule 801 (d)(2): "The contents of the statement shall be 
considered but are not alone sufficient to establish ... the 
existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of 
the declarant and the party against whom the statement is 
offered under subdivision (E)." 
A recent Ohio case recognized this point. See State v. 
Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 550, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1 995) 
("Inclusion of the phrase 'upon independent proof of the 
conspiracy' in Evid.R. 801 (D)(2)(e) distinguishes Ohio prac-
tice from practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and 
precludes a finding that the statement itself may be used to 
establish the existence of the conspiracy. See Giannelli, 
Ohio Rules of Evidence Handbook (5 Ed.1 994) 211, 214."), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 575 (1995). 
PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS & 
EXCiTED UTTERANCES 
Ohio Rule 803(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
present sense impressions, and Rule 803(2) recognizes a 
hearsay exception for excited utterances. These rules are 
often used to introduce 911 tapes. For example, in State v. 
Kinley, 72 Ohio St.3d 491, 651 N.E.2d 419 (1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S.Ct. 1324 (1996), the Court held that statements 
of the victim's son to a 911 operator reporting that the de-
fendant and the victim were fighting "'were clearly admissi-
ble as "excited utterances" pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2)."' ld. at 
497 (quoting the court of appeals). The statements related 
to a startling event (the fight) and were made while the de-
clarant was under the stress of the excitement caused by 
the startling event. Although the Court did not discuss Rule 
803(1 ), those statements would also have been admissible 
as present sense impressions. They were statements de-
scribing an event (the fighting of the defendant and the vic-
tim) made at the time the declarant was perceiving the 
event. 
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See also State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 1 07, 684 
N.E.2d 668 (1 997) (tape of 911 call by victims' son reporting 
that he had found his parents' bodies properly admitted 
under 803(2)). 
STATE OF MIND 
Under Ohio Rule 803(3), statements of presently existing 
state of mind are excepted from the hearsay rule - provid-
ed state of mind is a material issue in the case. See Hong v. 
Children's Memorial Hospital, 993 F.2d 1257, 1265 (7th Cir. 
1993) (The rule "does not authorize receipt of a statement 
by one person as proof of another's state of mind:'), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994). 
In State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 514 N.E.2d 
394 (1 987), six witnesses testified that the victim was ''fear-
ful or apprehensive" of the defendant. The Ohio Supreme 
Court held that these statements were admissible under 
Rule 803(3). Similarly, in State v. Wages, 87 Ohio App.3d 
780, 789, 623 N.E.2d 193 (1993), a murder victim's state-
ments to her friends were admitted. According to the court 
of appeals, these statements came within Rule 803(3): 
"The victim made the statements at a time which reflected 
her state of mind; that the victim was fearful and scared:' 
The Ohio Supreme Court revisited the issue in State v. 
Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 338, 652 N.E.2d 1000 (1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 820 (1996). The Court upheld the 
trial court's decision to admit the testimony of witnesses 
about statements of the victim that she feared the defen-
dant: 
The trial court correctly ruled that the statements con-
cerning [the victim's] state of mind, i.e., her fear of ap-
pellant, were admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 803(3) 
and State v. Apanovitch .... The trial judge went to 
great lengths to ensure that the witnesses testified only 
to the fact that [the victim] expressed fear of the appel-
lant. The trial judge did not permit any testimony re-
garding the basis of [the victim's] fear. 
The following year, in State v. Awkal, 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 
331, 667 N.E.2d 960 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 776 
(1 997), the Court noted that, in Apanovitch, it had "limited 
this type of testimony to that reflecting the state of mind of 
the victim, but not the reasons underlying that state of 
mind:' The Court found the statements were erroneously 
admitted because they concerned the reasons for the vic-
tim's fear, that the defendant had threatened the victim. and 
thus went beyond the limitation in Apanovitch. See also 
United States v. Joe, 8 F. 3d 1488, 1492-93 (1Oth Cir. 1993) 
("Ms. Joe's statement to Dr. Smoker, though indicating her 
state of mind, also included an assertion of why she was 
afraid (i.e., because she thought her husband might kill her). 
This portion of Ms. Joe's statement is clearly a 'statement of 
memory or belief' expressly excluded by the Rule 803(3) ex-
ception:'), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994). 
The Apanovitch decision itself is problematic. The state-
ments did reflect the victim's state of mind, and thus satis-
fied Rule 803(3). However, that state of mind was not a ma-
terial issue; the defendant's, not the victim's, state of mind is 
an element in a homicide case. In contrast, in an extortion 
case such statements would be relevant because the vic-
tim's fear is an element of the crime. See United States v. 
Adcock, 558 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1 977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 921 (1 977). McCormick discussed this problem: 
A recurring problem arises in connection with the 
admissibility of accusatory statements made before 
the act by the victims of homicide. If the statement is 
merely an expression of fear- i.e., "I am afraid of D" 
-no hearsay problem is involved, since the statement 
falls within the hearsay exception for statements of 
mental or emotional condition. This does not, howev-
"·. er, resolve the question of admissibility. The victim's 
emotional state must relate to some legitimate issue in 
the case .... 
... [Tlhe most likely inference that jurors may draw 
from the existence of fear ... is that some conduct of 
the defendant, probably mistreatment or threats, oc-
curred to cause the fear. The possibility of overpersua-
sion, the prejudicial character of the evidence, and the 
relative weakness and speculative nature of the infer-
ence, all argue against admissibility as a matter of rel-
evance. 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 276, at 243-44 (4th 
ed. 1992). 
The Ohio cases fail to reveal any reason why the victims' 
state of mind might be relevant. 
In another context, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized 
the problem. In State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 119-20, 
509 N.E.2d 383 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 916 (1988), 
the mother of a victim of rape and murder was permitted to 
testify that her daughter told her that she intended to remain 
a virgin. The Court acknowledged that the statement satis-
fied the requirements of Rule 803(3), but found that "[t]he 
relevance of [the victim's] statement to the issue of her non-
consent is tenuous at best. ... The potential for prejudice in 
[the] statement is considerable. We believe it should not 
have been admitted:' 
Objection to such statements on relevance (Rule 401 ), 
unfair prejudice (Rule 403(A)), and confrontation grounds 
\,,,should be made in every case. 
MEDICAL TREATMENT STATEMENTS 
Rule 803(4) recognizes a hearsay exception for state-
ments made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment, including a description of medical history, past or 
present symptoms, pain, sensations, and the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source if reason-
ably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Although the rule 
requires the statement be made for medical diagnosis or 
treatment, the statement need not be made to a physician. 
"Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or 
even members of the family might be included:' Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 803. E.g., United States v. 
Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1992) (clinical psychol-
ogist), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 976 (1992). 
Nevertheless, the basic requirements of the exception 
still apply. For example, in State v. Jones, 114 Ohio App.3d 
306, 321, 683 N.E.2d 87 (1996), the court of appeals ob-
served: "Appellant argues that because Falke is a social 
worker whose function did not include diagnosis or treat-
ment and that Kimberly Pizzo's statements were not taken 
for the purpose of treatment or diagnosis, Evid.R. 803(4) is 
not applicable. This argument, as even appellee concedes, 
appears to have some force." Similarly, in State v. Chappell, 
97 Ohio App.3d 515, 646 N.E.2d 1191 (1994), the court 
stated that Rule 803(4) does not apply where a social work-
,() ~er's function was neither diagnosis nor treatment. 
BUSINESS RECORDS 
Ohio Rule 803(6) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
records of regularly conducted business activities. An issue 
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that has divided some appellate courts in Ohio concerns the 
admissibility of reports from private DNA laboratories. In 
State v. Lane, 108 Ohio App.3d 477, 488, 671 N.E.2d 272 
(1995). the court of appeals considered the admissibility of 
a casefile containing results of DNA testing prepared by 
Cellmark Laboratories. The court stated that, "[w]here a 
document generally satisfies the elements of Evid.R. 803(6), 
but was prepared in anticipation of litigation, the underlying 
rationale of trustworthiness is supplanted by a natural moti-
vation to color the facts in favor of the requesting entity:• 
The court concluded that "[t]he DNA casefile prepared by 
Cellmark was certainly prepared as part of its business. Yet 
the casefile was prepared for the sole purpose of litigation 
and, therefore, lacks the requisite trustworthiness:· ld. at 
477. 
The court noted, however, that in State v. Fontenette, 
1991 WL 184324 (unreported) (1991 ), another court of ap-
peals "held that records of DNA evidence prepared for trial 
are admissible as a business records exception to the 
hearsay rule pursuant to Evid.R. 803(6)." 108 Ohio App.3d 
at 487-88. 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
Ohio Rule 803(8) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
public records and reports. These records often contain 
double hearsay by declarants who are not public officials. 
For example, in State v. York, 115 Ohio App.3d 245, 685 
N.E.2d 261 (1996), the court of appeals held inadmissible 
an accident report, made by a state highway patrol officer, 
because the report contained statements of one of the dri-
vers involved in the accident. The court stated that a "police 
report generally constitutes a public record for purposes of 
Evid.R. 803(8) .... However, the statements made therein 
must be either the firsthand observations of the official mak-
ing the report or those of one with a duty to report to the 
public official." ld. at 248 (citing 2 Giannelli & Snyder, 
Evidence§ 801.38, at 148 (1996)). The court noted that it 
could find "nothing in the law which imposes such an official 
duty on a party involved in an accident." ld. The court con-
tinued: 
R.C. 5503.02(A), which requires State Highway Patrol 
troopers to investigate and report on traffic accidents, 
places no duty on an accident victim to make such a 
report. Persons involved in accidents are under a duty 
to report the accident to the registrar of motor vehicles, 
R.C. 4509.06, and they are required to stop and give 
their name, address and vehicle registration number 
to the other party involved. R.C. 4549.02. However, 
'neither of these statutes places an express official duty 
on an individual to report his or her preaccident obser-
vations to an investigating officer. The absence of any 
such official duty breaks the link in Evid.R. 803(8)(b) 
which would make [the driver's] statements admissible 
into evidence. Those statements could not be admit-
ted as part of [the state trooper's] report, and the trial 
court properly excluded them below. ld. at 248-49. 
See also Pool v. Wade, 115 Ohio App.3d 449, 453-54, 685 
N.E.2d 794 (1996) (FDA bulletin held inadmissible under 
Evid.R. 803(8)(b) because it contained "hearsay statements 
which were not firsthand observations of the official making 
the report and ... evaluative or investigative information 
from laypersons:'). 
-., 
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RULE 804: UNAVAILABILITY 
Rule 804(A) contains five conditions of unavailability. 
Federal courts have recognized a sixth, usually called "for-
feiture by wrongdoing:' In 1997, a new division was added 
to Federal Rule 804(8)(6): "A statement offered against a 
party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that 
was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the 
declarant as a witness." It applies to actions taken after the 
event to prevent a witness from testifying. The federal note 
states: "The wrongdoing need not consist of a criminal act. 
The rule applies to all parties, including the government. ... 
The usual Rule 1 04(a) preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard has been adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule 
804(b)(6) seeks to discourage:' Advisory Committee's Note, 
Fed. Evid. R. 804 (1997). · 
GRAND JURYTESTIMONY 
Ohio Rule 804(8)(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
former testimony. Grand jury testimony is not admissible 
against a criminal defendant because the opportunity to ex-
amine the declarant is lacking. State v. Woods, 48 Ohio 
App.3d 1, 5, 548 N.E.2d 954 (1988). In contrast, the prose-
cution is provided that opportunity, and some cases have 
ruled that grand jury testimony may be admissible against 
the government. For example, in United States v. Foster, 
128 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 1997), the court noted that 
"[t]hree Circuits have suggested and the District of 
Columbia Circuit has affirmatively ruled that the government 
has the same motive to develop a witness' testimony during 
a grand jury proceeding as it does at trial." See also United 
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Henry, 448 F.Supp 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978). 
In United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 
1997), the First Circuit agreed that grand jury testimony may 
fall within the purview of the former testimony rule in some 
cases, but such a case would be rare because the prosecu-
tion's motive is often different at the grand jury than at trial. 
The court wrote: "Grand juries present a different face. 
Often, the government neither aims to discredit the witness 
nor to vouch for him. The prosecution may want to secure a 
small piece of evidence as part of an ongoing investigation 
or to compel an answer by an unwilling witness or to 'freeze' 
the posit.ion of.an ad~erse witness. In particular, discrediting 
a grand Jury w1tness 1s rarely essential, because the govern-
ment has a modest burden of proof, selects its own witness-
es, and can usually call more of them at its leisure:' ld. at 
523. VVhile this argument has merit, tile defense could 
make a comparable argument concerning preliminary hear-
ing testimony, and yet such testimony has been admitted, 
even in face of a confrontation challenge. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (dissent); California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (dissent). 
Moreover, the rule requires only that the "opportunity" to 
develop the testimony by examination has been provided at 
the former hearing. "Actual cross-examination, of course, is 
not essential, if the opportunity was afforded and waived:' 2 
McCormick, Evidence§ 302, at 306 (4th ed. 1992). See 
also State v Jester, 32 O.S.3d 147, 153, 512 N.E.2d 962 
(1 ~87), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); 5 Wigmore, 
Ev1dence § 1371 (Chadbourn rev. 197 4). Failure to examine 
the declarant for tactical reasons does not change the re-
sult. E.g., Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 
1492, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[A]s a general rule, a party's 
decision to limit cross-examination in a discovery deposition 
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is a strategic choice and does not preclude his adversary's 
use of the deposition at a subsequent proceeding."); United 
States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (1st Cir. 1979) 
("Defense counsel made a tactical decision not to question 
Smith [at the suppression hearing]; this does not mean they 
were denied an opportunity to do so:'), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 967 (1980). 
This issue was raised but not decided in United States v. 
Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992), on remand, 974 F.2d 231, 
237-41 (2d Cir. 1990). 
STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTERESTS 
Ohio Rule 804(8)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
declarations against interest. 
Corroboration Requirement 
The rule provides that a "statement tending to expose the 
?eclarant to criminal liability, whether offered to exculpate or 
Inculpate the accused, is not admissible unless corroborat-
ing circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement." In State v. Branham, 104 Ohio App.3d 355, 359, 
662 N.E.2d 54 (1995), the court of appeals upheld the trial 
court's determination that corroboration was lacking for sev-
eral reasons: 
In this case, the trial court found insufficient corrobo-
rating circumstances to establish the trustworthiness 
of [the declarant's] statements, since (the declarant] 
had a motive to fabricate, had made at least some of 
the statements in jest, and had told numerous contra-
dictory stories. The trial court concluded that since ap-
pellant and [the declarant] were involved in an intimate 
relationship, [the declarant] had a motive to make the 
statements to assist in the acquittal of appellant, her 
paramour. When the statements were made, the trial 
court found that [the declarant] was concerned with 
getting appellant "off the hook;' since she believed she 
had a viable defense, namely battered woman's syn-
drome, that would exonerate her from all liability for the 
crime. Therefore, we find sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's conclusion that the 
[corroboration] required by Evid.R. 803(8)(3) was not 
satisfied. 
IMPEACHMENT OF HEARSAY DECLARANTS 
Ohio Rule 806 governs the admissibility of evidence re-
lating to the credibility of hearsay declarants. As the federal 
drafters explained, "The declarant of a hearsay statement 
which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His 
credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and 
support as though he had in fact testified:' Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. Evid. R. 806. Accordingly, these de-
clarants may be impeached by showing bias, untruthfulness 
character, evidence of prior convictions, inconsistent state-
ments, and so forth. 
If an accused's hears~y statements are elicited by the de-
fense through another Witness, Rule 806 applies, and the 
accused may be impeached with evidence of a conviction. 
In other words, an accused may be impeached even though 
he never testified. See United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 
1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 
(1985); United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, 1130 (6th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1091 (1980). See general-
ly Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of the 
Nontestifying Defendant, 56 Ohio St. L. J. 495, 504 (1995). 
